

CIA/OCI/BRIEF 124-75  
11 AUGUST 1975

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BRIEF

# 124

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EAP BRIEF 124-754

1. THAILAND: UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HAVE BEEN HOLDING RALLIES DURING THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS TO PROTEST THE ARREST OF NINE STUDENT AND FARMER LEADERS ACCUSED OF ABDUCTING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF CHIANG MAI.4

THE STUDENTS HAVE CLOSED AT LEAST SIX UNIVERSITIES AND DRAWN SUPPORT FROM SOME LABOR AND LEFTIST GROUPS. THEY ARE DEMANDING UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF THE NINE.4

THE KHUKRIT GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO HAVE THE SITUATION WELL IN HAND AND REMAINS FIRM IN ITS INTENTION TO PROSECUTE THE CHIANG MAI CASE; IT HAS ISSUED A LENGTHY STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND STATING ITS DETERMINATION TO SEE THE MATTER THROUGH IN THE COURTS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS FOLLOWED A LOW-KEY APPROACH--NO RIOT POLICE HAVE BEEN CALLED OUT IN BANGKOK.4

THE CURRENT TENSION IS BEING AGGRAVATED BY A GROWING POLARIZATION BETWEEN THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND THAI SECURITY OFFICIALS, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE STUDENTS ON THE OTHER. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT CLEARLY IS NOT SEEKING A CONFRONTATION WITH THE STUDENTS,

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A PROVOCATEUR FROM EITHER THE RIGHT OR LEFT OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM COULD SPARK AN UGLY INCIDENT. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. THAILAND-LAOS: RELATIONS BETWEEN VIENTIANE AND BANGKOK ARE DETERIORATING FURTHER. IN APPARENT RETALIATION FOR THE LACK OF LAO ACTION IN FREEING TWO THAI ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHES DETAINED SINCE EARLY LAST WEEK, THAILAND HAS ORDERED ITS AMBASSADOR HOME FOR "CONSULTATIONS."4

A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL IN BANGKOK INFORMED THE PRESS ON AUGUST 10 THAT AMBASSADOR SAWET MUST SEEK A MEETING WITH THE LAOTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO INFORM HIM OFFICIALELY OF THE RECALL ORDER. THE MEETING IS SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY, AND IF THE MEN ARE NOT RELEASED, SAWET PLANS TO RETURN TO BANGKOK LATER IN THE DAY.4

SAWET'S PLANNED MEETING WITH THE LAOTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, HOWEVER, SEEMS NOT TO INDICATE A DESIRE TO GIVE THE LAOTIANS SOME MANEUVERING ROOM AND PERHAPS AVOID THE ACTUAL AMBASSADORIAL RECALL. BANGKOK DOES NOT WANT TO SEE THE DISPUTE ESCALATE FURTHER AND ALMOST CERTAINLY WANTS TO AVOID A CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO

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A FORMAL BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. {SECRET} E-2 IMPDET.H

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MEA BRIEF 124-75.4

1. IRAQ: IRAQ HAS CIRCULATED AMONG PERSIAN GULF STATES A DRAFT "DECLARATION ON FREE NAVIGATION IN THE ARAB GULF AND STRAIT OF HORMUZ." THE DOCUMENT IS BAGHDAD'S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION SHOULD BE. IT ILLUSTRATES THE WIDE GAP BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN ON THE FORM OF SUCH CO-OPERATION, AND REFLECTS THEIR EQUALLY CONFLICTING STANCES ON LAW OF THE SEA.4

THE IRAQI DRAFT CALLS FOR FREE NAVIGATION FOR ALL COMMERCIAL VESSELS--SUBJECT TO LOCAL ANTI-POLLUTION LAWS--AND FOR NAVAL VESSELS OF CONTRACTING STATES. ALL OTHER WARSHIPS ARE TO REFRAIN FROM USING THREATS OR FORCE AGAINST LITTORAL STATES WHILE IN THE GULF, AND ARE TO BE SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.4

THE SHAH OF IRAN HAS COMPLAINED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH TO REGIONAL SECURITY IS ESSENTIALLY MEANINGLESS, BECAUSE IT GIVES NO PROTECTION TO LITTORAL STATES NOT ALREADY AVAILABLE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW. IN REPLY, THE IRAQIS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT

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POWERS IN LOW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS TO HELP JUSTIFY THE UNIM-  
PEDED PASSAGE OF THEIR SHIPS.4

IRAN, ON THE OTHER HAND, SINCE MID-1969 HAS BEEN DEVISING  
WAYS TO HAVE THE PERSIAN GULF DECLARED A "CLOSED SEAB." IN 1970  
THE SHAH SAID, "BY DECLARING THE PERSIAN GULF AN INLAND SEA, THE  
LITTORAL STATES WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL AND CHECK ALL SHIPPING  
IN THEIR WAT~~TER~~ERWAY..." THE TERM "SEMI-~~OPEN~~ENCLOSED" HAS SINCE  
CREPT INTO THE IRANIAN LEXICON, BUT THEIR INTENTION HAS NOT  
CHANGED.4

OMAN IS ALSO UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT THE IRAQI FORMULATION. LIKE  
IRAN, IT BORDERS ON THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. OMAN IS ONE OF THE  
HALF DOZEN OR SO HARDCORE OPPONENTS OF A LAW OF THE SEA DECLARA-  
TION SUPPORTING UNIMPEDED PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL STRAITS.  
OMAN FAVORS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WARSHIPS AND SHIPS POSSESSING  
"SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS"--A CATCH PHRASE FOR NUCLEAR-POWERED  
SHIPS AND SUPER-TANKERS. OMAN ALSO WANTS COASTAL STATES TO HAVE  
THE RIGHT TO REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OR AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PAS-  
SAGE OF WARSHIPS. SUCH RESTRICTIONS ARE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO

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THE US AND OTHER MARITIME POWERS.

THE VEHEMENCE OF THE OMANI POSITION AT LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCES IS SURPRISING. THEIR FLEDGLING BUREAUCRACY IS RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED IN SUCH COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL MATTERS, AND THEIR SECURITY WOULD NOT SEEM TO REQUIRE THE RESTRICTIONS THEY PROPOSE.

CONCEIVABLY, THE OMANIS SERVE AS A STALKING HORSE FOR THE SHAH, WHO WOULD HAVE MORE DIFFICULTY BACKING OFF FROM AN EXTREME POSITION. OMAN AND IRAN ALREADY COOPERATE ON GULF SECURITY MATTERS, AND RELATIONS ARE GOOD BETWEEN THE SHAH AND SULTAN QABUS.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

2. TUNISIA: PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA MAY REHABILITATE FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER MOHAMED MASMOUDI, NOW IN EXILE IN LIBYA. MASMOUDI WAS BANISHED OVER A YEAR AGO FOR WHAT BOURGUIBA DESCRIBED AS BEHAVIOR NOT CONSISTANT WITH THE POLICY OF THE NATIONAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT. MASMOUDI HAS BITTERLY AND PUBLICLY CRITICIZED TUNISIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM SINCE HIS FALL, AND HAS COURTED TUNISIAN DISSIDENTS IN LIBYA AND IN EUROPE. HE HAS MADE NO PERSONAL ATTACKS AGAINST BOURGUIBA, HOWEVER, AND THEREBY KEPT OPEN THE

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POSSIBILITY OF AN EVENTUAL RETURN TO BOURGUIBA'S GOOD GRACES.  
 BOURGUIBA HAS A PENCHANT FOR REHABILITATING FORMERLY TRUSTED ADVISORS AFTER A PERIOD OF BANISHMENT AND A FORMAL APOLOGY FROM THEM.

US OFFICIALS IN TUNIS NOTE THAT MASMOUDI'S RETURN WILL PROBABLY ENCOUNTER STIFF OPPOSITION FROM PRIME MINISTER NOUIRA, WHO BLAMED MASMOUDI FOR ENCOURAGING THE ABORTIVE TUNISIAN-LIBYAN MERGER AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 1974. IT WAS NOUIRA WHO ADVISED BOURGUIBA TO REMOVE MASMOUDI. A FULL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN NOUIRA AND MASMOUDI IS UNLIKELY.

BOURGUIBA'S CONCERN OVER LIBYA'S INTENTIONS TOWARD TUNISIA AND MASMOUDI'S INVOLVEMENT WITH DISSIDENTS MAY HAVE GENERATED THE PLAN TO BRING THE FORMER MINISTER HOME. HIS RETURN WILL PROBABLY BE VIEWED BY TUNISIAN OFFICIALS AS ONE WAY OF REDUCING LIBYAN EFFORTS TO USE TUNISIAN DISSIDENTS FOR SUBVERSION AGAINST BOURGUIBA. {SECRET}

3. INDIA: A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WILL SHARPLY REDUCE THE POWERS OF INDIA'S COURTS AND FURTHER INSULATE PRIME MINISTER

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GANDHI FROM ANY POSSIBLE THREAT TO HER POWER.4

THE NEW AMENDMENT, APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT LATE LAST WEEK, PROHIBITS THE COURTS FROM TAKING ANY ACTION IN DISPUTES OVER ELECTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER, THE FIGUREHEAD PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT, OR THE SPEAKER OF THE LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT. THE AMENDMENT EXPLICITLY BARS THE COURTS FROM CHALLENGING LEGISLATION ENACTED EARLIER IN THE WEEK THAT RETROACTIVELY INVALIDATED THE LAWS UNDER WHICH GANDHI WAS CONVICTED OF ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN PRACTICES.4

SUPREME COURT HEARINGS ON GANDHI'S CONVICTION HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO BEGIN MONDAY BUT NOW ARE BARRED UNDER THE NEW LAWS.4

THE AMENDMENT ALSO REMOVES SEVERAL OTHER IMPORTANT PIECES OF EXISTING LEGISLATION FROM THE COURTS' JURISDICTION, INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION, NATIONALIZATION, AND LAND REFORM. LAST MONTH, PARLIAMENT ENACTED A LAW PROHIBITING COURT CHALLENGES TO THE STATE OF EMERGENCY PROCLAIMED BY GANDHI'S GOVERNMENT IN JUNE.4

BY PREVENTING THE COURTS FROM CHALLENGING A WIDE RANGE OF

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MAJOR ACTIONS, THE NEW AMENDMENT FURTHER SOLIDIFIES GANDHI'S CONTROL OVER ALL ASPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE INDIAN JUDICIARY HAS TRADITIONALLY ENJOYED A REPUTATION FOR INDEPENDENCE, AND THE SUPREME COURT HAS MADE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS IN THE PAST TO BLOCK MOVES BY GANDHI'S GOVERNMENT.

GANDHI HAS USUALLY CIRCUMVENTED THE COURTS BY USING HER PARTY'S OVERWHELMING MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT TO ENACT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. SHE CLAIMS THAT PARLIAMENT SHOULD ENJOY SUPREMACY OVER THE COURTS BECAUSE ELECTED LEGISLATORS REPRESENT A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE, WHILE THE JUDICIARY, IN HER VIEW, OFTEN SPEAKS FOR ONLY A PRIVILEGED MINORITY.

THE GOVERNMENT IS EXPECTED TO INTRODUCTION ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN GANDHI'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS WHEN A SPECIAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENT CONVENES LATER THIS MONTH. (CONFIDENTIAL) E-2 IMPDET.H

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EUROPEAN BRIEF 124-75.4

1. USSR: THE SOVIET PRESS HAS BEGUN CARRYING PESSIMISTIC REPORTS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET GRAIN HARVEST. IN STORIES APPARENTLY INTENDED TO PREPARE THEIR READERS FOR WORSE NEWS TO COME, BOTH IZVESTIA AND PRAVDA HAVE REPORTED THAT THE SUMMER DROUGHT AND POOR PREPARATION FOR THE HARVEST ARE TAKING THEIR TOLL ON CROP YIELDS. THE STORIES CITE INSTANCES WHERE CORN, ORIGINALLY INTENDED FOR GRAIN, HAS HAD TO BE HARVESTED FOR SILAGE AND GREEN FODDER. THE REPORTS ALSO NOTE SOME LOSS OF GRAIN FROM SHATTERING IN AREAS HARDEST HIT BY THE DROUGHT. ALTHOUGH THE STORIES ALSO BLAME POOR PREPARATION OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE WORSENING PROSPECTS, SUCH CHARGES ARE COMMON IN BOTH GOOD YEARS AND BAD. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

2. USSR: THE EFFUSIVE SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE OF HELSINKI POINTS TO THE MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS TALKS AS THE NEXT ITEM ON MOSCOW'S EUROPEAN NEGOTIATING AGENDA.4

ALEXANDER BOVIN, WRITING<sup>111</sup> IZVESTIYA AND OTHER COMMENTATORS ARE SAYING THAT THE HELSINKI SUMMIT HAS CREATED A CLIMATE CON-

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DUCIVE TO ONGOING DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING MBFR AND  
 SALT. THERE IS NO SUGGESTION OF ANY COMPROMISE IN SOVIET POSI-  
 TIONS AS A RESULT OF CSCE AND NO EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW PLANS ANY  
 OTHER MAJOR DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME.4

THE COMMENTARIES HAVE GIVEN NO HINT OF WHAT ELSE MOSCOW HAS  
 IN MIND FOR ITS EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY. NOR DOES IT APPEAR THAT THE  
 SOVIETS ARE GOING TO USE CSCE TO PUSH ANY TIME SOON FOR REGIONAL  
 CONFERENCES ELSEWHERE.4

THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING THEIR OWN INTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE  
 HELSINKI DOCUMENT MEANS. THE POLITBURO COMMUNIQUE BLESSING CSCE  
 REFERS TO THE HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGES WITHIN THE "OBSERVANCE OF THE  
 LAW AND TRADITIONS OF EACH COUNTRY." THIS WORDING HAD BEEN SPECIFI-  
 CALLY REJECTED BY THE WEST DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IS NOT IN-  
 CLUDED IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT.4

THE SOVIETS AREA ALSO TAKING THE OFFENSIVE ON THE NONINTER-  
 FERENCE CLAUSE OF THE CSCE DOCUMENT. THEY USED IT IN PRAVDA ON  
 AUGUST 7 TO EXCORIATE THE EC FOR WHAT MOSCOW ARGUES INS THE WEST'S  
 INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF PORTUGAL. THIS LINE IS

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CLEARLY INTENDED TO BE PRE-EMPTIVE. MOSCOW HAS ALREADY SHOWN ITS  
 SENSITIVITY TO ALLEGATIONS THAT IT IS MATERIALLY SUPPORTING THE  
 PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS AND THE RADICAL ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES  
 MOVEMENT, AND IT UNDOUBTEDLY ANTICIPATES THAT THE WEST WILL SOONER  
 OR LATER CLAIM THAT THE SOVIETS ARE VIOLATING THE HELSINKI AGREE-  
 MENTS. {CONFIDENTIAL}

3. PORTUGAL: THE NEW PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT, ANNOUNCED  
 FRIDAY AND HEADED BY PRO-COMMUNIST PRIME MINISTER VASCO GONCALVES,  
 IS DOMINATED BY RADICAL MILITARY OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN SYMPATHIZERS  
 OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY. IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO ALIENATE  
 LARGE SEGMENTS OF PORTUGAL'S ALREADY AROUSED POPULACE; THE MOST  
 IMMEDIATE THREAT COMES FROM A DISSIDENT GROUP WITHIN THE ARMED  
 FORCES MOVEMENT.

PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES ATTEMPTED TO DILUTE RESENTMENT FRIDAY  
 BY DESCRIBING THE NEW CABINET AS A TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT THAT  
 WOULD ALLOW THE COUNTRY A BREATHING SPELL IN ITS POLITICAL STRIFE.

NOW THAT A POWERFUL GROUP OF NONRADICAL OFFICERS HAS BEEN  
 MOVED BY GONCALVES' TACTICAL TRIUMPH TO MAKE PUBLIC THEIR DIFFER-

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ENCES WITH HIS POLICIES, THE TWO CAMPS APPEAR TO BE ON A COLLISION COURSE. SENSING THAT ARRESTS OR A PURGE MAY BE IMMINENT, THE DISSIDENTS--WHO INCLUDE A LARGE NUMBER OF THE ORIGINAL LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTION, AS WELL AS THE COMMANDERS OF TWO OF THE FOUR PORTUGUESE MILITARY REGIONS--ARE CANVASSING FOR SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE MILITARY AND GIVING THEIR FELLOW OFFICER FOUR DAYS TO CHOOSE SIDES.4

A KEY FACTOR WILL BE THE STAND TAKEN BY GENERAL OTELO DE CARVALHO, THE OPPORTUNISTIC HEAD OF THE SECURITY FORCES. ALTHOUGH HE PUBLICLY DISAVOWED A DOCUMENT PUBLISHED BY THE NONRADICAL LEADERS THAT CALLS FOR AN END TO THE PRESENT REGIME, HE REPORTEDLY SUPPORTED IT PRIVATELY AND ENCOURAGED ITS DISSEMINATION. IF HE IS CONVINCED OF THE SUCCESS OF THE OPPOSITION, HE WILL SUPPORT IT.4

EVEN WITHOUT CARVALHO'S PUBLIC SUPPORT, THE OPPOSITION GROUP CONSTITUTES A FORMIDABLE THREAT TO THE COMMUNISTS AND MOVEMENT RADICALS. DISSIDENT LEADERS ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE COMMUNISTS MAY CREATE A COUNTERREVOLUTION SCARE OR ENCOURAGE THOSE AROUND FORMER PRESIDENT SPINOLA TO ATTEMPT A COUP, WHICH

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WOULD BE EASILY CRUSHED. SUCH AN EVENT WOULD TORPEDO THE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS OF THE OPPOSITION'S HOPES OF OUSTING GONCALVES AND HIS SUPPORTERS.4

THE DISSIDENTS' PROGRAMMATIC DOCUMENT PROVIDES A RALLYING POINT FOR NONRADICAL ELEMENTS OUTSIDE THE MILITARY, INCLUDING THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES. SOCIALIST LEADER MARIO SOARES, WHO FRIDAY CALLED THE NEW GOVERNMENT "CRYPTO-COMMUNIST," REPORTEDLY HAS GIVEN THE DOCUMENT HIS ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT. IT IS LIKELY TO HAVE BROAD APPEAL ALSO AMONG THE CLERGY AND THOSE WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE RECENT INCIDENTS OF ANTI-COMMUNIST VIOLENCE IN THE NORTH PARTICULARLY AFTER GONCALVES' STATEMENT FRIDAY THAT HIS NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD USE "REPRESSIVE MEASURES" TO STIFLE DISSENT.4

BY MONDAY THE ANTI-REGIME DOCUMENT APPEARED TO BE DRAWING WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FROM MILITARY UNITS THROUGHOUT PORTUGAL. THE DECISION OF THE RULING THREE-MAN DIRECTORATE TO SUSPEND THE NINE ORIGINAL SIGNERS FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MAY INCITE MORE SOLDIERS DISSATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE COUNTRY IS BEING RUN BY

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THE RADICALS TO ACCEPT THE DOCUMENT.

A COMMUNIQUE ON THE SUSPENSIONS, ISSUED SUNDAY NIGHT BY THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, SAYS THAT THOSE OFFICERS HOLDING PURELY POLITICAL POSTS WERE ORDERED TO REPORT TO THEIR GENERAL STAFFS FOR REASSIGNMENT. THOSE WHO HELD MILITARY POSITIONS, NAMELY THE COMMANDERS OF TWO OF PORTUGAL'S THREE MILITARY REGIONS, WILL RETAIN THEIR COMMANDS. CARVALHO HAS PUBLICLY DENOUNCED THE DISSIDENTS' DOCUMENT, BUT IS REPORTEDLY WAITING TO SEE HOW MUCH SUPPORT THE DOCUMENT GETS BEFORE FULLY COMMITTING HIMSELF. THE SECURITY FORCES' COMMUNIQUE IS BEING INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION OF CARVALHO'S SUPPORT FOR THE DISSIDENTS.

ARMY UNITS, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, MET SUNDAY TO DECIDE HOW TO REACT TO THE SUSPENSION OF THE NINE. AT LEAST 400 OFFICERS AND SOME ENTIRE UNITS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE SIGNED THE DOCUMENT. TWO OF THE THREE MILITARY REGIONS VOTED THEIR APPROVAL IN PLENARY SESSIONS.

THE ORIGINAL SIGNERS REQUESTED THAT MILITARY PERSONNEL MAKE THEIR POSITION KNOWN BY MONDAY. FINAL ASSESSMENT OF SUPPORT MAY

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BE DELAYED BEYOND MONDAY'S DEADLINE, SINCE CIRCULATION OF THE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN SLOWED PARTLY BECAUSE PRO-GONCALVES SUPPORTERS HAVE THREATENED TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST THOSE WHO CIRCULATE THE DOCUMENT. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT INFORMATION MINISTER JESUINO HAS ORDERED THAT NO MENTION OF THE DOCUMENT BE MADE IN THE MASS MEDIA.4

THE DISSIDENTS APPARENTLY HOPE THAT GONCALVES WILL RESIGN PEACEFULLY, BUT IF HE REFUSES HE WILL HAVE TO RELY ON REPRESSIVE TACTICS.4

THE SOCIALISTS, MEANWHILE, ARE COMPLETELY BEHIND ANTUNES' EFFORTS TO DIMINISH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN PORTUGAL. THEY ARE ALSO ENCOURAGING VISITS FROM WEST EUROPEAN SOCIALIST LEADERS, HOPING TO ATTRACT THEIR SUPPORT AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SOCIALIST PARTY IS ACCEPTABLE TO WESTERN EUROPE. DANISH PRIME MINISTER JORGENSEN ARRIVES MONDAY AS THE FIRST OF THREE VISITORS.

{CONFIDENTIAL}4

4. ITALY: THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY LAST WEEK ENDED ITS OPPOSITION TO DISCUSSING POLITICAL ISSUES WITH THE COMMUNISTS

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ON THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL.4

UNDER FORMER PARTY SECRETARY AMINTORE FANFANI THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WERE FLATLY AGAINST ANY INCREASE IN COOPERATION WITH THE COMMUNISTS AT THE LOCAL OR NATIONAL LEVEL. INTERIM CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC LEADER ZACCAGNINI, HOWEVER, WON UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FROM THE PARTY'S EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE FOR AN "OPEN COMPARISON" OF IDEAS WITH THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS ON LOCAL LEGISLATIVE MATTERS. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, NONETHELESS, MAINTAINED THEIR BAN ON ACTUAL PARTICIPATION WITH THE COMMUNISTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.4

THE NEW ELEMENT IN THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POSITION IS THE PARTY'S APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO BRING ITS CONTACTS WITH THE COMMUNISTS INTO THE OPEN. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE TWO PARTIES HAVE CONSULTED DISCREETLY IN MANY AREAS FOR YEARS. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE TRIED TO MAKE THE PRACTICE MORE VISIBLE AS ANOTHER WAY OF ESTABLISHING THEIR PARTY'S RESPECTABILITY.4

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO APPLY THE NEW STANDARDS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL WILL INEVITABLY ARISE THIS FALL WHEN THE FATE OF THE FRAGILE MORO GOVERNMENT COMES UNDER REVIEW. THE SOCIALISTS

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ARE MAKING CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC ACCEPTANCE OF "INDIRECT" COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION A CONDITION FOR RENEWED SOCIALIST PARTICIPATION IN THE CENTER-LEFT COALITION.4

ALTHOUGH THE NEW CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POSITION PAVES THE WAY FOR AN INSTITUTIONALIZED DIALOGUE WITH THE COMMUNISTS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, IT IS MORE A RECOGNITION OF POLITICAL REALITY THAN A NEW DEPARTURE. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS IN 5 OF THE 20 REGIONS--LOMBARDY, MARCHE, LAZIO, CALABRIA, AND BASILICATA--HAD ALREADY AGREED TO AN OVERT CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REGIONAL CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENTS AND THE COMMUNISTS. THE SAME THING IS HAPPENING IN A NUMBER OF CITIES AND PROVINCES.4

MORE CHARACTERISTIC OF POST-ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS, HOWEVER, IS THE PROLIFERATION OF COMMUNIST-SOCIALIST COALITIONS. THE "RED BELT," WHERE SUCH COALITIONS HAVE BEEN THE RULE, HAS NOW GROWN FROM THREE TO FIVE REGIONS WITH THE ADDITION OF LIGURIA AND, MORE RECENTLY, PIEDMONT. LEFTIST ADMINISTRATIONS CONTROL ALL OF THE CITIES NORTH OF ROME WITH MORE THAN 300,000 PEOPLE--MILAN, TURIN, VENICE, FLORENCE, GENOA, AND BOLOGNA. CLOSE TO A THIRD OF THE 94

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PROVINCES AND PROVINCIAL CAPITALS HAVE, OR ARE EXPECTED TO GET, LEFTIST ADMINISTRATIONS.4

THE COMMUNISTS ARE NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY WITH THIS TREND, BECAUSE IT RUNS COUNTER TO PARTY CHIEF BERLINGUER'S GOAL OF AN EVENTUAL POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENT WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, I.E., THE "HISTORIC COMPROMISE." THE COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY NEED A MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS IN ORDER TO AVOID PROVOKING ADVERSE REACTION IN CENTRIST AND CONSERVATIVE CIRCLES. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.H

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**WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 124-75.4**

**1. ARGENTINA: A SENIOR ARGENTINE DIPLOMAT HAS TOLD AMBASSADOR HILL THAT HE EXPECTS PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA PERON TO ANNOUNCE A CABINET REORGANIZATION EARLY THIS WEEK.4**

**RUMORS OF ANOTHER CABINET SHAKEUP HAVE BEEN GIVEN SOME CREDENCE BY PRESIDENT PERON'S MEETING ON AUGUST 20 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER VIGNES AND FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ROBLEDO, WHO RETURNED FROM BRAZIL WHERE HE TOOK UP HIS POST AS AMBASSADOR ON JULY 30.4**

**THERE HAVE BEEN TWO CABINET SHAKEUPS WITHIN THE PAST MONTH IN AN EFFORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISERS TO HALT THE PROLONGED POLITICAL INFIGHTING AND ECONOMIC DETERIORATION THAT HAS WEAKENED THE GOVERNMENT. KEY ADVISERS ARE PROBABLY URGING THE PRESIDENT TO FILL TOP POSTS WITH PERSONS HAVING ENOUGH STATURE TO DEAL WITH THE COUNTRY'S SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND TO HELP RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE PERONIST GOVERNMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD.4**

**IT IS LIKELY TO BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT, HOWEVER, TO FIND CAPABLE INDIVIDUALS WILLING TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE PERON GOVERNMENT. {SECRET}4**

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**2. LATIN AMERICA: SEVERAL RECENT HEMISPHERIC MEETINGS HAVE PROVIDED A PAUSE IN THE TREND TO EXCLUDE THE US FROM LATIN AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL AFFAIRS.Y**

**THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROAD NEW ORGANIZATION, THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM, WAS POSTPONED WHEN NUMEROUS CRITICIS AT THE CONFERENCE IN PANAMA RAISED THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS THAT THE LEADING PROPONENTS-- VENEZUELA AND MEXICO--HAVE TRIED TO IGNORE.Y**

**THE VAGUE PRINCIPLES OF THE SYSTEM TAKE NO ACCOUNT OF THE MANY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES THAT DIVIDE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA, FAIL TO CLARIFY THE SYSTEM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH EXISTING PACTS, AND LEAVE OPEN THE QUESTION OF WHO WOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR THE LEAST-DEVELOPED AREAS.Y**

**A WORKING GROUP HAS BEEN ASSIGNED THE TASK OF DRAFTING A MORE SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF THE ORGANIZATION'S GOALS AND STRUCTURE FOR PRESENTATION AT ANOTHER MEETING ON OCTOBER 15.Y**

**THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN OF THE RELUCTANT GOVERNMENTS IS THAT THE PROPOSED ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION'S PRINCIPAL GOAL IS PRECISELY WHAT THE PROMOTERS INSIST IT IS NOT: TO PRESSURE THE US. THE DEMURRING**



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**GOVERNMENTS ARE RESIGNED TO JOINING THE SYSTEM EVENTUALLY IN THE INTERESTS OF SOLIDARITY, BUT THEY ARE PLEASED AT HAVING WON A DELAY.4**

**THE IDEA OF A LATIN-ONLY ORGANIZATION FITS IN WITH THE NOTIONS OF BASIC ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE US AND LATIN AMERICA THAT HAVE BEEN BUTTRESSED BY FREQUENT WRANGLING AND BITTERNESS. THE RECENT OAS CONFERENCE AT SAN JOSE TO AMEND THE RIO TREATY PROVIDED A VERY DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE STATE OF RELATIONS.4**

**LATIN AMERICAN AMBIVALENCE OVER INTERESTS INCREASINGLY AT ODDS WITH THOSE OF THE US AND THE LONG-STANDING TRADITION OF "NATURAL" ALLIANCE HAS BEEN EVIDENT MAINLY IN THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE LATINS' PRAGMATIC BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH THE US AND THEIR AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS.4**

**THE MEETINGS AT SAN JOSE EXHIBITED THE AMBIVALENCE EN MASSE. AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF REPEATED ACCUSATIONS OF US MEDDLING, INFLUENCE, AND INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR AFFAIRS, THE LATINS IN EFFECT PAID HOMAGE TO THE JUDGMENT THAT THEIR BASIC SECURITY IS NATURALLY LINKED WITH THAT OF THE US.4**

**AFTER A CRITICAL TWO-YEAR REVIEW OF THE RIO TREATY, THE LATIN**

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GOVERNMENTS MADE ONLY SMALL ALTERATIONS IN THE 23-YEAR-OLD DOCUMENT AND ENDORSED THE PACT ESSENTIALLY AS IT WAS WRITTEN.4

ONE CHANGE CORRECTED A CLARIFICATION BY THE CUBAN ISSUE--THE REQUIREMENT THAT SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE CAN BE REMOVED ONLY BY THE SAME MARGIN. TECHNICALLY, HOWEVER, THE TWO-THIRDS RULE REMAINS IN FORCE UNTIL THE AMENDMENTS AGREED AT SAN JOSE ARE RATIFIED BY TWO THIRDS OF THE SIGNATORIES.4

AS AN EXPEDIENT FOR THE INTERIM, THE DELEGATES RECONVENED IN SAN JOSE AS AN "ORGAN OF CONSULTATION," THE NECESSARY GUISE FOR DEALING WITH SANCTIONS, AND VOTED A "FREEDOM OF ACTION" RESOLUTION THAT LEAVES EACH OAS MEMBER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA A PURELY BILATERAL AFFAIR.4

AGREEMENT ON BOTH THE TREATY AND THE SANCTIONS WAS BROAD AND LEFT THE US IN COMPANY WITH A NEAR CONSENSUS. ONLY PERU AND PANAMA, ON THE "LEFTIST" END OF THE LATIN SPECTRUM, REMAIN UNHAPPY WITH SOME BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE RBO TREATY. URUGUAY, CHILE, AND PARAGUAY, ON THE "RIGHTIST" END, TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO THE ACTION ON SANCTIONS.4

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SAN JOSE MEETINGS PUT A BETTER FACE ON

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INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS THAN THEY HAVE HAD IN SOME TIME. THE  
EXPERIENCE OVERALL DEMONSTRATED THAT, DESPITE THE MANY COMPLAINTS FROM  
LATIN AMERICA ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE US, IN MATTERS OF HEMISPHERIC  
DEFENSE THERE IS A PERMANENT COMMON INTEREST. {CONFIDENTIAL}  
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